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S u p r e m e Court
In Re: REQUEST OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THEODORE
FRANCIS GREEN, GOVERNOR O F T H E
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, FOR AN OPINION AS
TO THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION FOR
THE CALLING AND HOLDING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

SUPPLEMENTAL SUGGESTIONS
BY
T H O M A S F . COONEY

Supreme

Court

In Re: Request of His Excellency, Theodore Francis
Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, for an Opinion as to the
Validity of Legislation for the Calling and Holding
of a Constitutional Convention.
SUPPLEMENTAL SUGGESTIONS
By
T H O M A S F . COONEY

The writer respectfully suggests supplemental to what is
set out in his brief in regard to the obsolescence of Art. X I I I
of the Constitution consideration of the following:
"The said propositions shall be, by said clerks, inserted
in the warrants or notices by them issued, for warning
the next annual town and ward meetings in April; and
the clerks shall read said propositions to the electors
when thus assembled," etc.
Taylor vs. Place, p. 360. The word "shall" used in Art.
X I I I is mandatory upon the town and city clerks to perform
the several acts referred to in the manner and at the time
prescribed and not otherwise.
Those provisions of the Constitution contemplated the annual town meeting of historic periods when and where all
the electors assembled at one place, or had an opportunity
to do so, and, while thus convened, be informed by the town
clerk of the proposal to amend the Constitution before voting thereon. That period expired with the termination of
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the ox cart days. It is almost as extinct as the dodo which
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines as—
"A large heavy flightless bird now extinct. * * * Its existence is recorded as late as the year 1681."
The anachronism of Art. X I I I in this respect is demonstrated when the Court considers that the City of Providence
has seventy-seven voting districts.
For the purpose of Art.
XIII each of them is to be considered a separate
township,
the electors in which are entitled to have the warrant containing the proposed amendment read to them by the city
clerk at the same moment when and as they are all assembled in each district.
This, of course, is absolutely impossible. The electors in
one district have no right to be present at any other than
the one in which they are located by the Board of Canvassers for the City of Providence. They can not all be in attendance at one and the same moment in the same district.
With this situation present, how can the city clerk, in the
words of Art. XIII,
"read said propositions to the electors when thus assembled,"?
Is it not obvious that that Article reflects a period wholly
out of harmony with the present day conditions?
So far as the writer is informed, there is but one authentic
case recorded where the same person was present at two
places at the same moment. It is the miracle referred to
Saint Anthony of Padua.
In Vol. 1, Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 557, it is stated as follows:
"After having been Guardian at Le-Puy (1221), we find
Anthony in the year 1226, Custos Provincial in the
Province of Limousin. The most authentic miracles
of that period are the following. Preaching one night
on Holy Thursday in the Church of St. Pierre du
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Queriox at Limoges, he remembered he had to sing a
Lesson of the Divine Office. Interrupting suddenly his
discourse, he appeared at the same moment among the
friars in choir to sing his Lesson after which he continued his sermon."
The Court will observe that nothing short of a miracle explains the incident in which Saint Anthony figured. Inasmuch as the age of miracles has long since gone by, it would
be interesting to determine, if he were living now, how he
could perform the duties imposed upon the city clerk of
Providence under the terms of Art. XIII, which mandatorily
require his presence at seventy-seven places at the same moment. It is apparent that the Constitution requires amendment in no Article as much as in Art. XIII. in order to have
it a practicable measure.
It is to be observed that the term "district"
as distin<4
guished from "town" and ward" meetings did not come into
the Constitution until 1900.
Art. XI. Sec. 2, "Of Amendments", adopted in November
of that year, for the first time, included—
"and district meetings on the Tuesday next after the
first Monday in November annually."
When the Constitution was adopted in 1843 such a subdivision of the State was unknown. In the course of time
it became necessary to create it in order to expedite elections :
At the argument, Mr. Sherwood stressed the conservatism of our "venerated ancestors" in the matter of giving
them time to think over a proposal to amend the Constitution reflected in the fact that after the matter passed the
assembly, it was to come before the electors at the "next
annual town and ward meetings in April."
"If a majority of all the members elected to each house.
at said annual meeting. shall approve any proposition
thus made, the same shall be published and submitted
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to the electors in the mode provided in the act of approval, and if then approved by three-fifths of the electors of the State present and voting thereon, it shall become a part, of the Constitution of the State."
The period during which the electors may ponder the proposal to amend, before they can act, even if they were unanimous in their desire to do so, is extended by at least one year
beyond that which is provided in Art. XIII.
This is so because of Art. XVI, Sec. 1, "Of Amendments", adopted in November 1911, which provides
for biennial elections of members of the General Assembly.
No such period was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution in 1842. It is obvious that such a delay in connection with such an important matter as changing the Constitution, which proposal may be unanimously acceptable to
the electors, awaiting only an opportunity to express their
approval thereof, renders it inefficacious by the unreasonable lapse of time necessarily involved in the substitution of
the period applicable to the biennial election for that prescribed by "said annual meeting".
In a word, even if all the electors agree in regard to the
merit of a proposal to amend the Constitution, nevertheless
and notwithstanding, they can not act thereon earlier than
the next biennial election. There is no such thing as "said
annual meeting" at which to choose "a majority of all the
members of each house" whose approval is indispensable before the proposal can "become a part of the Constitution of
the State."
Because of Art. XVI, Sec. 1, "Of Amendments", which
deals with biennial elections, meritorious proposals to
amend the Constitution agreed to unanimously by the General Assembly in the first instance; and, for the purpose
of the argument, also by the unanimous vote of the electors at the first biennial election held subsequent to
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the submission of the proposal by the assembly for all practical purposes, may as well be referred "Ad Kalendas
Graecas—To the Greek Kalends—i. e., never."
Our predecessors did not foresee, when writing Art. XIII,
the changed conditions with which this generation is confronted. They overlooked the maxim:
"Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis."
"Times change and we change with them."
The mandatory provisions of Art. X I I I of the Constitution are absolutely impossible of execution at this time. No
substitute therefor has been provided. Each and all of them
must be performed in accordance with the express mandate
of the Constitution in order to have them become a part
thereof. The omission to carry out any one of the several successive steps provided in Art. X I I I renders abortive any attempt to have a proposal of amendment adopted legally excepting always the right of the people to adopt such measures submitted to them even though it be unconstitutionally
done. The truth of this is demonstrated upon a momentary
scrutiny of Art. XIII.
Hence the absolute impracticability at this time of an attempt to amend the Constitution in accordance with its
terms. It simply can not be done.
Articles XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX,
and X X "Of Amendments" are valid notwithstanding that
they were not adopted in compliance with Art. XIII. They
were submitted to the people and adopted by them, even
though it was irregular in the first instance.
As pointed out in the Attorney General's brief, p. 14,
quoting former Chief Justice Marcus Morton, of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:
"Whether we sit regularly or irregularly, whether by
right or usurption. if the people choose to adopt what we
submit to them, it then becomes valid."
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The same argument is advanced by Mr. William P. Sheffield, Sr., in the introductory part of his article in reply to
the statements of Judge Bradley and Abraham A. Payne.
It is to be observed that the briefs of Messrs. Sherwood,
Tillinghast, and Chace contain considerable matter in which
they claim that Art. XIII of the Constitution is the sole
medium of amending it available at this time. The contention of the writer to the contrary was argued in their presence on the 17th inst. Neither of them questioned its validity then.
Now that it has been brought to their attention, they
should be permitted, if they desire, as officers of the Court,
to present their views on that subject. They might respond
to an invitation to them by the Court to offer such considerations in writing as they may wish to submit, if any, in answer to the writer's assertion that Art, X I I I is now wholly
obsolete and it is impracticable, if not impossible, to make
use of it as they claim.
The writer has furnished Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Tillinghast with a copy of the suggestions.
Respectfully submitted,
T H O M A S F . COONEY.

State of Rhode Island and P

Supreme Court
IN RE: CALLING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION

THIS BRIEF IS PRESENTED TO THIS COURT BY
THOMAS J. FLYNN AND JAMES W. LEIGHTON,
AT THE INVITATION AND ON BEHALF OF HON.
ROBERT E. QUINN, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND.
Its Purpose is to Show That the General Assembly Has
Power to Call a Constitutional Convention; That the
Advisory Opinion to the Contrary Was Clearly Wrong
As a Judicial Decision; That the Majority Always Has
the Right and Power to Make and Alter the Constitution; That Thorough Revision Can Be Made in No
Other Way; That This Doctrine is Strictly in Accord
With the Provisions of the Existing Constitution and of
Article I, Section 1, More Particularly; That the Constitution Framed By This Convention Should Be Submitted to the Vote of the Electors, and Should Become the
Law of the Land if Approved By a Majority of Those
Voting Thereon, As Was the Case, When the Existing
Constitution Was Adopted in 1842.
THOMAS J . FLYNN,
J A M E S W . LEIGHTON,

Counsel.

Supreme

Court

In Re: Calling of a Constitutional Convention

THIS BRIEF IS PRESENTED TO THIS COURT BY
THOMAS J. FLYNN AND JAMES W. LEIGHTON,
AT THE INVITATION AND ON BEHALF OF HON.
ROBERT E. QUINN, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND.
Its Purpose is to Show That the General Assembly Has
Power to Call a Constitutional Convention; That the
Advisory Opinion to the Contrary Was Clearly Wrong
As a Judicial Decision; That the Majority Always Has
the Right and Power to Make and Alter the Constitution; That Thorough Revision Can Be Made in No
Other Way; That This Doctrine is Strictly in Accord
With the Provisions of the Existing Constitution and of
Article I, Section 1, More Particularly; That the Constitution Framed By This Convention Should Be Submitted to the Vote of the Electors, and Should Become the
Law of the Land if Approved By a Majority of Those
Voting Thereon, As Was the Case, When the Existing
Constitution Was Adopted in 1842.
Article 1, Section 1, of our constitution expressly declares, in the words of the Father of his Country, that
"the basis of our political system is the right of the
people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
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The foregoing is not a preamble, but it is a part of the
constitution itself, and is clearly a declaration of a right
which is reposed in the people of the State.
To make and alter their constitutions are very significant
words, and clearly mean that by an explicit act of the whole
people a new constitution may be set up, or an existing one
altered. If the people of the State desire to make a new
constitution, the right is reposed in them to do so by said
Article 1, Section 1, and a constitutional convention, composed of delegates chosen by the electors, and the result of
whose labors will be submitted to the electors for approval
or rejection, is a proper and convenient medium to initiate
the process which will enable the people to act and speak
authentically. This method is perfectly consistent with orderly government as is evident from the fact that in the
early days of our State no question of its propriety was
raised, and the present constitution was drafted by a convention.
If in said article 1, Section 1, elaborate, detailed provisions had been inserted, setting forth the procedure to be
followed by the people in order to make and alter their constitutions of government, no implication drawn from any
other part of the constitution would be allowed to stand in
the way of the people exercising their said rights. We submit that the absence of such elaborate, detailed provisions
does not render any less absolute and secure this expressly
recognized right. Details are properly omitted from a
written constitution, the law making body being the proper
branch of government to carry into effect the principles
stated and the powers and rights granted or reserved, by
appropriate legislative action.
It will undoubtedly be claimed, however, that it has already been decided by the justices of this court that the
general assembly has no power to call a constitutional con-
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vention because they have already said so in their advisory
opinion rendered March 30th, 1883 and reported in 14 R. I.
at page 651. In passing it may be noted that the speed
with which the questions were decided almost brought an
apology from the court, as it stated on page 655:
"The questions are extremely important, and we
should have been glad of an opportunity to give them
a more careful study, but under the request of the
Senate for our opinion without any unnecessary delay,
we have thought it to be our duty to return our opinion
as soon as we could, without neglecting other duties,
prepare it."
To rely on the court's advisory opinion is the common
device of those not desiring a constitutional convention, and
they shield themselves behind that opinion, professing that
respect for the opinions of the court requires acceptance
of the principles therein stated.
Having such profound respect for the court, why do they
not also defer to the court's own declaration and recognition of the fact that such advisory opinions have no weight
as precedents?
In the case of Allen vs. Danielson, 15 R. I. 480, after a
full hearing, with arguments and citations of authorities
on both sides, this court reversed their own advisory opinion
on the same subject in 13 K. I. 9, giving as one of their
reasons for doing so, the fact that the question in 13 R. I. 9,
"Was a petition for an opinion on a case stated, and
was doubtless submitted without full argument or
presentation of authorities * * * But we have no
doubt that we should have decided the case differently
if we had before us, when we decided it, the same array
of authorities which we have before us now."
In Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324, the same question came
before the Supreme Court, in an actual case, that the judges
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had previously given a written opinion upon, to the governor. The court, by Ames, C. J. said:
"This is the first time, since the adoption of the constitution, that the question has been brought judicially
to the attention of the court. The advice or opinion
given to the governor or to either house of the assembly,
under the third section of the tenth article of the constitution, is not a decision of this court; and given as
it must be, without the aid which the court derives in
adversary cases from able and experienced counsel,
though it may afford much light from the reasonings
or research displayed in it, can have no weight as a
precedent"
Thus the supreme court of this State has, therefore, decided on two occasions that an advisory opinion of its members is not conclusive, and may be reversed when the same
matter comes before the court in an actual case.
We submit that the court is likewise justified in not being
bound by a previous advisory opinion when requested for a
second advisory opinion on the same subject.
Reason and logic lead to this conclusion.
The delegates to the constitutional convention held in
1842, in omitting to prescribe how a constitutional convention may be called, knew, or may be supposed to have known,
the prevailing custom of calling such conventions by legislatures, and that the practice present in 1842, in this and
other States, fixed this as a part of the accepted law of
the land. In fact the convention in which they met had
been brought into being by action of the legislature.
We adopt a construction that gives effect both to Article
1, Section 1, and to Article XIII of the constitution. It
gives effect thereby to the absolute and unlimited right of
a majority of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government, as expressly stated in Article 1, Section 1. It gives effect, also, thereby to Article XIII, stating

1
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the limited manner in which one branch of the government,
the general assembly, may initiate amendments to the constitution. But for the express limitation upon the power
of the general assembly therein contained, the usual majority of the general assembly could propose amendments for
the approval for the usual majority of the electors. They
are forbidden to do so, except by a majority of all the
members elected to each house in two successive general
assemblies. A self-imposed limitation is also placed upon
the power of the electors, preventing them from acting by
the usual majority, and requiring the assent of three-fifths
of the electors voting thereon, before any amendment thus
proposed shall become a part of the constitution. To extend Article X I I I by implication into an abrogation of the
expressed right reserved in Article 1, Section 1, is to violate
the well known rule of construction requiring effect to be
given, if possible, to all provisions of an instrument.
Instead of following the rule thus stated, the advisory
opinion of the judges enlarges the scope and operation of
Article XIII, beyond anything ever contemplated by its
framers, makes it exclusively by what it thus finds impliedly
in it, and thereby entirely abrogates and excludes Article 1,
Section 1, thus depriving the people of their expressly reserved right to make and alter their constitution of government. It is not thus that constitutional guarantees are to
be construed.
In view of these facts and principles, still insisting that
the general assembly has the power to call a constitutional
convention, and denying the right is prohibited by the advisory opinion, which we claim is clearly erroneous and
does not have the force and effect of a decision, we respectfully urge this court to so decide.
Article 1, Section 1, of the constitution of Rhode Island
begins:
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"In the words of the Father of his country, we declare that the basis of our political systems is the right
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of
govern m en t " * * *
The right of the people to make and alter their constitution of government could not be more expressly stated or
more explicity reserved. It is an unqualified, absolute right.
The framers put it in the first part of the written constitution, as the very right of all rights. Nothing can deny
or destroy it. It is there, fixed and unalterable, and it
only remains to give it force and effect.
This might have been done by inserting a clause in the
constitution providing the means for carrying it into effect.
Failure to find, however, in the constitution any written
directions as to procedure does not abrogate the right.
There is the right of the people stated clearly and the
trainers must have concluded that this right would be
effected in the usual manner, namely a convention.
The usual rule of construing such statements of rights
and express reservations of powers in a written instrument
is to give them full force and effect by broad construction
and interpretation. Their scope is not to be narrowed by
implication or restriction, but they are to be enlarged and
given full effect in securing the freedom of the subject and
the preservation of his rights and privileges with all the
consequences flowing therefrom.
It is in this spirit that all the other statements of rights
in our bill of rights are always construed and carried into
effect.
In pursuance of this general policy of the law, it has
always been held that the legislature has the power to pass
laws to carry into effect the powers granted or reserved in
the bill of rights.

In Article 4, Section 1, of the present constitution we
find the following:
"This constitution shall be the supreme law of the
State, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void.
The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to
carry this constitution into effect."
Under said section, we submit that the general assembly
has ample authority to legislate for the purpose of bringing
a constitutional convention into being.
The right of the people is expressly reserved by Article 1,
Section 1, and the words "The general assembly shall pass
all laws necessary to carry this constitution into effect"
are sufficiently broad to justify the legislature in passing
such legislation as may be convenient for providing the
orderly means for the people to act.
Also in Article IV, Section 10, we find the following provision :
"The general assembly shall continue to exercise the
powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited
in this constitution."
There is no doubt that prior to the adoption of the present
constitution, the general assembly had the right to call a
constitutional convention, for the present constitution was
drafted by a convention brought into being by legislative
action. It, therefore, follows that the general assembly still
has such power unless it is prohibited by the constitution.
The advisory opinion of the court, above referred to, says
that Article X I I I prohibits the legislature from providing
for a constitutional convention.
We submit that this conclusion is erroneous, and as previously stated, the framers of our constitution were perfectly familiar with the convention method, and if they
intended that the amending article was to be in substitution
of that method, they most certainly would not have left the
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prohibition to implication, but would have stated it positively.
Plenty of specific prohibitions are set forth in the constitution, for instance: the government is divided into three
branches and the scope of each is defined; the legislature is
prohibited from passing any ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts (Article 1, Section 12) ;
the general assembly is denied power to incur state debts
to an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars, except in
time of war or insurrection, without the express consent
of the people (Article IV, Section 13) ; lotteries are prohibited (Article IV, Section 12) ; and the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed (Article 1, Section 22).
Other examples of prohibitory features could be cited,
but these seem sufficient to point out that the framers of
our constitution were able to prohibit in clear language,
and did not leave to inference. If it had been their intent
to prohibit the changing of the fundamental law of the State
in any other way than that set forth in Article X I I I , they
would have said so in clear prohibitory language just as
they did in the examples cited above. The convention method of making a constitution is not prohibited by any part
of the constitution, and hence, it being a power possessed by
the general assembly prior to the adoption of the present
constitution, it is still possessed by the general assembly under and by virtue of the terms of Article IV, Section 10.
The general assembly of the State has, therefore, the
power to pass all legislation necessary to give effect to the
expressly reserved right of the people to make and alter
their constitution or government. One of the most appropriate, natural and common means to effect this end is the
issuance of a call to the people of the State to elect delegates to meet in a convention to make such alterations
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in the constitution as may be necessary, and to submit the
result of their labors to the approval or disapproval of the
electors, when a necessity arises for revising the constitutions. As necessary means to this end the general assembly
may provide the time, mode, and manner for the election
of such delegates and for the submission of their labors to
the electors, and, if their vote be in the affirmative, the time
when the new constitution shall take effect. All this was
done in connection with our present constitution.
These are implied powers of the general assembly in the
premises, resulting from the general grant of legislative
powers to this department of government, contained in
Article IV and the inherent and indefeasible right of the
people, to make and alter their constitution of government,
which, as it happens in this State, is also in the written
constitution, an expressly stated right.
Whenever, therefore, the general assembly is satisfied that
it is time a new constitution should be framed, it has the
right and the power, yes, even more, the duty, to call a
constitutional convention.
I t is a matter of common knowledge that public opinion
has for years considered the need of a new constitution.
The general assembly has considered the subject year after
year in one form or another, as for example by the questions
put to the judges in 1883, and by authorizing the appointment in 1897 by the governor of a commission to draft a new
constitution by amending the old one, and by resolving on
J a n u a r y 27th, 1897;
"There is a widespread feeling among the people of
the State that the constitution should be carefully and
thoroughly revised, and such changes as seem to be desirable, in view of the changed condition of affairs since
it was adopted, properly and carefully prepared."
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The right of the people to make and alter their constitution of government being absolute and being expressly
stated, no limitation can be placed upon it by finding such a
limitation implied in another clause of the constitution.
Hence, to contend that this right can only be exercised
after proposal of an amendment by the majority of all the
members elected to each house of two successive general
assemblies, would be to place an implied limitation in the
declaration made in Article 1, Section 1, by the makers of
our constitution.
Let us, therefore, see how it would read:
T H E BASIS OF OUR POLITICAL SYSTEMS I S
T H E R I G H T OF T H E P E O P L E TO MAKE AND
ALTER T H E I R CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, T H I S R I G H T OF
T H E P E O P L E I S S U B J E C T TO T H E W I L L OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN T H E MANNER
PROVIDED IN ARTICLE X I I I .
The absolute right expressly secured to the people (and
this means a majority of the people) is to be defeated by
an implication that what was meant that it could not be
exercised unless proposed by a majority of all the members
of each house of two successive general assemblies, and approved by a three-fifths majority of the electors. This is
to substitute, first, the will of the general assembly for the
will of the people; and, second, the will of three-fifths for
the will of a majority of the people. Is it thus that expressly stated sovereign rights are to be hedged in by implication ?
Rather should a way be sought to give effect to both
clauses of the constitution, and this, it is submitted can
easily be done by restricting the operation of Article X I I I
to the case of amendments proposed by the general assembly,
leaving Article 1, Section 1, to apply to everything outside
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of such amendments proposed by the people's agent, the general assembly. Surely a construction is to be preferred
that shall give full force and effect to both clauses of the
constitution rather than a construction that shall extend
the operation of one clause to the extinction of the other
clause, especially when the effect is to enlarge by implication the power conferred upon the people's agent, the
general assembly, while completely extinguishing the express power reserved in the other to the people in their
sovereign capacity.
It is submitted that Article X I I I relates only to amendments through the initiative of the general assembly, and
has nothing to do with Article 1, Section 1, reserving expressly the right of the people (not the general assembly)
to make and alter their constitution of government. In this
view Article X I I I is something extraneous and additional
to Article 1, Section 1, providing not how the people may
make and alter their constitution of government, but how
the agent of the people, the general assembly, may initiate
or suggest amendments, and providing further what sanction of the people shall make such suggested amendments
a part of the constitution.
These repeated acts of the general assembly, before the
present constitution was adopted, in calling constitutional
conventions, show that when the constitution was framed,
with the express statement in it that the people have a right
to make and alter their constitution of government without
providing specifically how this was to be done, the framers
of the constitution took it for granted that the general
assembly could do what it had done before, i. e., call a constitutional convention whenever the necessity might arise.
Article X I I I provides that an amendment that has been
passed by two successive general assemblies by a majority
of all the members elected to each house, and is approved
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by a three-fifths of the electors voting thereon, shall thereupon become operative as a part of the constitution.
Plainly this mode of amending the constitution upon
the initiative of the general assembly has nothing to do
with the right of the people to make and alter their constitution of government, and cannot, even by implication,
be considered as limiting that right in any way, but rather
as setting up another and an additional manner in which,
by the initiative of the general assembly only, can a change
be made in the constitution.
How can the absolute power of the people be limited
simply by express mention of the way in which one agent
of the people can propose amendments? Suppose it had
been another agent of the government that had been intrusted with the power. Suppose the constitution had provided that the governor or the supreme court could suggest
or initiate amendments that should become operative when
sanctioned by a three-fifths majority, by what rule of construction could this additional mode of amending the constitution be tortured into an implied negation of the expressly stated right of the people to make and alter their
constitution of government?
By this is meant that just as the present constitution became operative when ratified by a majority vote of the
electors, so a new constitution framed by a constitutional
convention called by the general assembly will become operative when ratified in the same way by a majority vote of
the electors.
If asked, by a majority of what electors, the answer is,
by a majority of the electors including those who will be
qualified as electors under such new constitution.
This is what happened when the present constitution was
adopted. In the case of a small electorate and a new constitution that greatly enlarges the electorate, if the question

1
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of its adoption be left to the old electorate, no change would
ever be made. The old electors vote always to retain their
own special privileges. Our old charter was abrogated
finally and the present constitution with its enlarged
electorate was carried by the votes of the new electors—
t h a t is to say, it was carried by the aid of those who were
not voters under the old system, but who became voters under the new system. In the last analysis the power rests
with those who constitute the majority.
And when we say the people are sovereign we mean that
their will as made manifest by the action of the majority
of electors determines the action of the State.
The common expression concerning the government of our
country is that the majority governs—the majority shall
rule.
I t is the majority, making its demands known through
the ballot box, that governs, and is therefore incapable of
being abrogated or defeated.
A sovereign power, though it may temporarily place
limitations upon the exercise of its own power, can, at any
time, resume the exercise thereof unhampered by its own
self-imposed limitations. The limitations placed by a sovereign power upon the exercise of its own powers are not
binding upon itself except in so f a r as it may choose to obey
them. The creation of self limitations by a sovereign power
is no bar to their abolition by the same sovereign power.
This is no argument for adopting a new constitution different from t h a t provided in the instrument itself, such as
in this case, extending beyond the express statement of the
people to make and alter their constitution of government,
even though the constitution is silent as to how this right
may be carried into effect.
I t so happens that other States of the Union have changed
their constitution in a manner different from that provided
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in the previous constitution. Delaware did in 1791; and
Maryland, in 1850 are examples. The defense offered for
the course is most able and is entirely convincing.
In State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, Corliss, J., says:
" I t is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on
the question whether Sec. 202 of the constitution prescribing the mode of amending the same prevents the
lawful assembling of a constitutional convention in
this state to revise the fundamental law. The decided
weight of authority, and the more numerous precedents
are arrayed on the side of the doctrine which supports
the existence of this inherent legislative power to call
a constitutional convention notwithstanding the fact
that the instrument itself points out how it may be
amended."
In Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. Stowe, J., says:
"There is underlying our whole system of American
government a principle of acknowledged right in the
people to change their Constitutions, except where especially prohibited in a Constitution itself, in all cases
and at all times, whether there is a way provided in
their Constitution or not, by the interposition of the
legislature, and the calling of a convention, as was done
in the case in hand. The offspring of revolution
originally, but restrained and modified by the necessity
arising out of the new principle established in this
country, by the accomplishment of our national independence, that the people are the government, and not
the king, and the source of all political power,—it has
become legitimated, and without mention in our Constitution, is as much the law of the land as if specifically
set out in them; and that as a solemn recognition of
this, and not as a revolutionary right, the section of
the Declaration of Rights in our own, and similar
clauses in other state Constitutions, were inserted."
If a majority of the people has not the power to make a
constitution binding forever or for a specific term of years,

1
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how can it have the power to make it binding forever unless
changed by more than a majority?
Whence can be derived the notion that a majority at any
one time has more power than a majority at any other time?
But it will be argued, if this be so, how can we give effect
to Article X I I I of our constitution providing for the adoption of amendments by a three-fifths vote only? Is not this
a limitation upon the power of the people to make and alter
their constitution of government?
The defense to this is, that it relates only to amendments
initiated by the legislature and not to an entire change of
the constitution; that the framers had this in mind when
they drafted the instrument, and that it was intended to
prevent the adoption by a majority only, when perhaps only
a light vote might be cast, of an amendment or amendments
not really coming from the people directly but suggested
or initiated by the servant of the people, the general
assembly.
If a three-fifths vote or a two-thirds vote is necessary to
effect a change, then the power is in the minority of twofifths or one-third to prevent it. This is inconsistent with
the provision of Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution
of the United States, guaranteeing to every State in the
Union a republican form of government; that State has
not a republican form of government where two-fifths or
one-third, and either can prevent three-fifths or two-thirds
from making or altering their constitution of government.
A republican form of government means a government in
which the majority govern.
Nowhere in the Constitution of the United States can a
method be found for guaranteeing to the States a republican
form of government. Cases are numerous, however, in the
United States Supreme Court, in which it has been held
t h a t notwithstanding this absence in the constitution, the
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power is in Congress to legislate in order to guarantee the
rights contained in Article IV.
In Smith vs. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511, at page 550, it was decided that although voluntary associations make constitutions and pass by-laws that they declare are not to be altered
except in a certain way or manner, as by the concurrence
of two-thirds or at two different meetings, etc., "yet this
constitution and by-laws may at any time be altered or
abrogated by the same power that created them, and the
vote of any subsequent meeting, abrogating or altering such
constitution, though passed only by a majority, has as much
efficacy as a previous vote establishing them. A constitution for a voluntary society may be proper, as an organization, but it has none of the powers and requisites of a constitution in political bodies, which emanates from a higher
power than the legislature, and always is supposed to be
enacted by a power superior to the legislature, and hence
is unchangeable except by the body which established i t ;
but that body can change it at pleasure" by which is meant
that the constitution cannot be changed by the legislature,
but the people who made the constitution can likewise destroy i t ; and this implies the power to set aside by a majority a self-imposed limitation, such as that a change shall
only be made by a three-fifths vote, or that it never should
be amended.
So the general assembly, by a majority vote may adopt a
rule that it shall pass laws only by a three-fifths vote.
But the same majority that passes such a rule can at any
time set it aside.
Were the provision fixed by a higher power, were it in the
constitution of the State, the general assembly could not
set it aside. But as a self-imposed limitation it is repealable by the same power that imposed it and by the same
majority.
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So if a clause in a State constitution declaring that any
vote more than a majority is necessary to change the constitution, it would be a self-imposed limitation that could be
set aside by the same power t h a t imposed it, and that power
is the majority of the electors as the representatives of the
sovereign will.
Were the provision one fixed by a higher power, were it
in the Constitution of the United States, it could only be
set aside by the people of the United States in the mode
provided for amending the constitution of the United States.
I t would no longer be a self-imposed limitation, subject to
repeal by the same power that imposed i t ; it would be a
limitation imposed by a higher power and subject to repeal
only by that higher power.
It is well known to all who have studied the history of
this State that the general assembly has always exercised
enormous powers conferred on this branch of the government under the Charter granted by Charles I I , in 1663, and
the limited powers conferred upon the executive.
The general assembly had judicial powers as well as legislative powers conferred upon it under this charter, and the
dual nature of the general assembly continued until the constitution was adopted in 1842, and even then the exercise
of judicial powers by the general assembly was not given up
until it was compelled to do so by the decision of our
supreme court (See Taylor vs. Place, supra).
Our forefathers would have been surprised had it been
foretold to them that by an implied construction, quasijudicial only, of the section relating to amendments only,
and initiated by the general assembly, their successors were
to be deprived of the expressly stated right to make and
alter their constitution of government.
There is but one proper application of the maxim, "Expressio Unius est exclusio Alterius" in the case of our consti-
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tution, i. e., the expressly mentioned way in Article X I I I of
the manner in which the general assembly may propose an
amendment is an exclusion of any other way in, which they
can propose them. To that extent the application of the
maxim is sound. It is denied however, that framing a new
constitution by a convention is amending the existing constitution. The maxim has no real application because Article X I I I relates to a different thing.
As Jameson, says, 4th Ed. p. 605, "because the people
could not do the same thing in a different way, it does not
follow that they could not do a different thing in a different
way." Therefore a limitation upon the power of one party
tof do one thing in one way is no limitation upon the power
of another party to do another thing in another way.
Especially is this true when it is possible to adopt a construction that \vill give full force and effect to both provisions of the constitution.
The objection to the construction adopted by the court is
that it finds an implied limitation in Article X I I I , therefore
Article X I I I is exclusive of all other methods, and hence
denies all effect to the expressly stated power of the people
to make and alter their constitution of government under
Article 1, Section 1.
It is not thus that constitutional guarantees are to be
construed.
It must be remembered also that our form of government
is not one in which all the power is in the legislative, judicial and executive branches thereof unless expressly reserved to the people. On the contrary, all power remains in
the people that is not expressly delegated to the three
branches named.
In State vs. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, Olds., J., on page 457,
says:
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"A constitution grants no rights to people, but is the
creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience • • # a written constitution is in every
instance a limitation upon the powers of government
in the hands of agents."
See also, Cooley, Const. Lims 5th Ed. 47.
The principle always to be followed is the one expressly
stated in Article 1, Section 1, and it is maintained herein
that no limitation can be placed upon that principle—the
right of the people, now and at all future time, to make
and alter their constitution of government by the will of
the majority of the electors.
For the right of the people to make and alter their constitution of government is absolute, and therefore cannot
be limited, expressly or by implication.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS J .
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The judges of this court have been requested by the Governor for their opinion in accordance with Article X I I , Section 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution on the following questions:
Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the
General Assembly should provide by law—
(a) F o r a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the S t a t e ;
(b) That the Governor shall call for the election, at a
date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such number and manner as the General Assembly shall determine;
(c) That the general officers of the State shall by
virtue of their offices be members of such convention ;
(d) F o r the organization and conduct of such Convention ;
(e) F o r the submission to the people for their ratification and adoption of any constitution or amendments proposed by such Convention; and
( f ) F o r declaring the result and effect of the vote of
a m a j o r i t y of the electors voting upon the question
of such ratification and adoption.
I t is the purpose of this brief to discuss only the broad
question of the legitimacy of effecting changes in our f u n d a mental law under the present Constitution by the convention method. Specific answers to the subsidiary questions
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propounded seem to the writer to spring spontaneously
from the conclusion which he has reached on the main
question. The propriety and expediency of any particular
matters of detail seem entirely irrelevant to a consideration
of the question of right involved. The scope of this brief
will therefore be limited to the question of whether the Constitution of Rhode Island may legally be altered, revised
or amended by the action of a convention called under an
act of the General Assembly when such action has been
ratified and adopted by a vote of a majority of the electors
voting thereon.
If Article X I I I of the Rhode Island constitution is to be
interpreted as an implied prohibition of action by the General Assembly calling a Constitutional Convention and no
other authority of the State has power to take such action,
it follows that the people must be said to have deliberately
tied their own hands and given up this power which admittedly they possessed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. In other words, this power of revising by the method
of conventions their form of government and the respective
powers of its various departments, which was up to this time
considered of such tremendous importance and the existence
of which was never denied by the most tory statesmen when
authorized by the existing legislature, was abdicated by the
people in 1842 and this surrender was made not by express
words but by mere implication from the grant of power to
the General Assembly to propose amendments. I t is not
merely a limitation upon the power of the General Assembly to enact a certain kind of legislation but a limitation
by the people upon themselves preventing them from exercising a power by many considered inherent and essential
and by all admitted to be of the greatest importance.
An interpretation which would bring about such a result
requires the most convincing reasons and the most accurate
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demonstration. Mere legal intendments or technical argument cannot suffice to convince the mind of the necessity
of a construction of language whose consequences are of
such great magnitude.
A correct analysis of the question before us discloses at
once that two rights or powers are involved, neither one
of which is by any logical necessity included in the other
and the confounding together of which has been the source
of much of the muddled thinking and even more muddled
writing upon this subject.
When the supreme power in any State is vested in one
ruler, or even when it is possessed by a small body of rulers,
that single person or that small body of persons is able to
act in any matter directly, immediately upon his or their
own initiative, without the intervention of any other person
or organ of the government. If the Czar of all the Russias
or the Sultan of Turkey possessed a right or power to make
this or t h a t change in the government of his domains he
could merely make the change of his own motion and was
never under the necessity of waiting for another to initiate
the process of creating an organ through which he might
act. When, however, the supreme power in the State is in
a large and constantly changing body, as in a modern republic, that large and constantly changing body, the people,
may possess rights or powers which it, from the very nature
of its multiple membership, cannot exercise except upon the
initiation of some other person or smaller body of persons.
The people of Rhode Island may have the right or power to
change its constitution but from its very nature it has not
the means of exercising that right or power except upon
the initiation of the General Assembly. Two rights or powers, therefore, are involved in the consideration of the question at bar, namely, (1) the right of the people to change
its constitution by the convention method, and (2) the
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power of the General Assembly to provide the machinery
for such change by an act calling a convention.
Neither of these rights logically includes the other. It is
a possibility that the people might possess the right above
ascribed to them and yet they might never have conferred
the authority on the General Assembly to take the initiative
in the exercise of that right. The power might be expressly
given to the General Assembly to call a convention and yet
it might be that the people had abdicated its right so to
change its constitution. Of course, it is extremely unlikely
that a situation would ever exist anywhere when one of
these rights or powers would exist without the other; and
when one was shown to exist the implication of the existence of the other would be almost irresistible. All that
is here insisted upon is the logical separation of the two, a
separation which will tend to greater clearness of thought
in the discussion of the question and will serve to expose
the rather subtle fallacies lurking in some of the principal
arguments heretofore advanced against the legitimacy of the
convention method of constitutional change in Rhode
Island.
It seems to be admitted by all who have up to this time
examined the question that the Constitution of Rhode
Island may be altered, amended or revised by means of a
convention followed by a vote of the electorate unless such
action be prohibited by the terms of the Constitution itself.
Article 1, Section 1, declares in the words of Washington's
Farewell Address that "the basis of our political systems
is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government;" Article IV, Section 2, vests the legislative power under the constitution in the General Assembly; and the same Article, Section 10, provides that "the
General Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers
they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this con-
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stitution." Our present constitution and the present constitutions of all of the other states in the Union were formed
by means of constitutional conventions called pursuant to
legislative acts. This is the natural and normal method by
which peoples "make and alter their constitutions of government" and was doubtless present to the mind of our first
president when he wrote those lines. This was the method
employed in 1842 by the people of Rhode Island in framing
and adopting our present constitution. The people then in
1842 possessed the right to change their fundamental law
by the convention method and unless they have parted with
that right they must still possess it. Likewise the power of
initiating the process of change by calling a convention was
in the General Assembly prior to 1842; and consequently,
since all legislative power under the constitution is vested
in it and since in addition it has all the powers exercised
by the General Assembly under the Charter, unless prohibited by the constitution, it follows that the present General Assembly must also have that power unless that power
is excluded by some provision of the constitution itself.
It has long been contended and will be strongly urged
here that there is an implied prohibition against a change in
our constitution by the convention method contained in
Article X I I I which reads as follows:
"Article X I I I . Amendments. The general assembly
may propose amendments to this constitution by the
votes of a majority of all the members elected to each
house. Such propositions for amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and printed copies of them
shall be sent by the secretary of state, with the names
of all the members who shall have voted thereon, with
the yeas and nays, to all the town and city clerks in the
state. The said propositions shall be, by said clerks,
inserted in the warrants or notices by them issued, for
warning the next annual town and ward meetings in
April; and the clerks shall read said propositions to the
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electors when thus assembled, with the names of all
the representatives and senators who shall have voted
thereon, with the yeas and nays, before the election of
senators and representatives shall be had. If a majority of all the members elected to each house, at said
annual meeting, shall approve any proposition thus
made, the same shall be published and submitted to the
electors in the mode provided in the act of approval;
and if then approved by three-fifths of the electors of
the state present and voting thereon in town and ward
meetings, it shall become a p a r t of the constitution of
the state."
When we consider that the very constitution which contains this provision was framed and proposed by a convention, that the constitutions then in force in every state of the
union had been adopted and many of them afterwards
amended in this same manner, and that the constitution of
the United States itself was the work of a convention, does
it not appear strange that, if it were intended to forbid such
a method of change for the future, no express words of prohibition were used? If constitutional conventions were considered by the framers of our fundamental law as equally
obnoxious with ex post facto laws and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts or as oppressive as the denial of trial
by jury and the taking of private property without just compensation, why did not this abuse equally merit an express
denunciation? The very omission of "an explicit act" prohibiting a convention in the future is a weighty argument
that no such prohibition was contemplated by the authors
of our constitution.
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ARTICLE XIII NOT AN ABDICATION BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES IN
THEIR CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION
METHOD.
As stated above the question here considered involves (1)
the right of the people to change its constitution by the convention method and (2) the authority of the General Assembly to provide the machinery for accomplishing this
change. If the people's right to change its constitution by
the convention method has been by them abdicated and abolished then there will be no necessity for considering whether
or not the legislative power to provide for the calling of a
convention exists. The first division of this argument will
therefore deal with the effect of Article X I I I upon the right
of the people as the supreme power in the state to make and
alter their constitution by means of a constitutional convention.
That this right exists at least originally in the people does
not admit of doubt in the American theory of government.
I t is affirmed as a cardinal principle by all writers on Constitutional Law and by all our public men from the earliest
times of the republic who have had occasion to deal with the
subject. I t is more or less explicity declared in the constitutions of all the states and in none more clearly, though
without the rhetorical flourishes and high sounding adjectives common to such declarations, than in Article I, Section
1 of the Rhode Island constitution. There the authority of
Washington is invoked to the effect that "the basis of our
political systems is the right of the people to make and alter
their constitutions of government." Even the most eminent
of the opponents of the view herein set forth does not deny
the original existence of this right, for Judge Durfee, himself, in "Some thoughts on the Constitution of Rhode Island"
at page 43, says: "Judge Bradley contends that the meaning
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(of Article I Section 1) is that the people have the right
to change the constitution by a mere majority vote, if they
only do it through the medium of a convention and under an
act of the General Assembly. I agree that it means this in
its retrospective application; for our fathers proceeded in
that manner when they adopted the present constitution."
What is the nature of this right which originally existed
in the people but is now alleged to have been lost? It has
been described as "inherent", "inalienable", "undeniable",
"indefeasible", but these adjectives, while not devoid of meaning, cast little light upon the nature of the right and seem to
convey only the same idea as the quotation from Washington
in Article I Section 1—that the right is "basic". One thing
is certain. The right is not one created by the constitution;
it is not a granted right, like the rights given the General
Assembly, the Judiciary and the Executive, for it belongs to
the people and the people are grantors in the Constitution,
not the grantees. It is a reserved or retained right (Article
I Section 23 of the Rhode Island Constitution) and consequently must have existed in the people before and, therefore, independent of the constitution itself. A right which
is the "basis of our political systems", which exists in the
people prior to and independent of a written constitution,
and which is a right to "make and alter their constitutions
of government" can be nothing but that right of sovereignty,
that supreme power, which Austin says must exist somewhere in every organized state.
Having established the existence of the right and its nature as basic and independent in origin of a written constitution, it remains to consider whether such a right is capable
in its nature of being limited and whether in fact the people
have limited it by Article X I I I .
That the sovereign power in a state cannot limit itself
without thereby ceasing to be sovereign is a dogma accepted
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by the more orthodox writers on jurisprudence and political
science. Although the idea by no means originated with Austin, its scientific formulation is justly attributable to him.
Dicey (Law of the Constitution, Ch. I ) defends the doctrine
by reasons both historical and logical. I t is thus that the
British Parliament, which is the sovereign power in the
British Empire, is incapable from its sovereign nature of
passing an unrepealable statute. I t cannot by an Act of Parliament disable itself from changing in any manner the organization of government by a subsequent Act of Parliament.
By a parity of reasoning it might be said that the people
of Rhode Island cannot by any means disable themselves
from changing their constitution by a subsequent constitutional convention.
Austin's doctrine has been said to be but a generalization
from the workings of government in the then existing states
of western Europe and this is doubtless the fact. I t is inconsistent in some respects with the theory of a divided sovereignty necessary to explain the existence of a Federal Union
and seems to take no account of those limitations on sovereign power which are contained in the nature and form of a
large body of persons possessing the sovereign power. Judge
Durfee (op. cit. p. 34) denies that the sovereign power is incapable of limitations but in his argument quickly abandons
the point and only demonstrates what no one ever thought
of denying, that the granted power of the General Assembly
might be limited. Daniel Webster in his argument in Luther
vs. Borden (see Works of Daniel Webster, Boston, 1851, Vol.
V I p. 225) states that the people "limit themselves by all
their constitutions in two important respects; that is to say,
in regard to the qualifications of electors and in regard to
the qualifications of the elected." Mr. Webster, however,
was not referring to limitations on the people as the sovereign power but only to certain qualifications, which he would

202
be the last to deny could be altered by the people by a change
in their constitution.
The true doctrine of the limitation of sovereign power in
an American state appears to be that the sovereign power is
limited and capable of limitation only in two respects; first,
by those restrictions necessarily involved in the fact t h a t the
sovereignty is held by a large and ever changing body of men,
and, second, by those restrictions imposed by membership in
a federal union. To the first class of restrictions belong the
principle that the people cannot, by reason of their numbers,
act directly and spontaneously but only by means of agents
and on the initiative of some organ created by them. To the
second class belong those limitations on state power expressly agreed to in the Constitution of the United States
or necessarily involved in the existence of the United States
as a nation.
But assuming that the people may limit their retained or
reserved right to alter their constitution, have the people of
Rhode Island in fact limited that right by adopting Article
X I I I of the constitution? Is Article X I I I a voluntary renunciation by the people of the right to hold a constitutional
convention? Have we, the people, by permitting the General
Assembly to propose amendments to the constitution abdicated our right to propose changes ourselves?
It is admitted on all sides that there is nowhere an express
renunciation of this right which the people admittedly possessed prior to the adoption of the constitution. It is sought,
however, to spell out an implied abdication from the terms
of Article X I I I by an application of the maxim: Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. I t is extremely difficult to see
how this maxim has any bearing upon the question of the
continued existence of the right in the people to amend their
constitution by the convention method, whatever its bearing
may be upon the power of the legislature to call a conven-
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tion, which will be discussed later. The argument seems to
be something like this: The express authority given the General Assembly to propose amendments takes away or annihilates the right of the people to alter their constitution by a
convention. In other words, authority to an agent to perform an act which may lead to a desired conclusion deprives
the principal of any right to effect the desired conclusion by
any other means. The very statement seems to show the absurdity of this contention when applied to the retained right
of the people. The maxim can never apply unless the means
sought to be excluded is of the same nature and kind as the
means expressed.
Judge Durfee (op. cit. p. 33) says: "Such a construction
in the matter of a statute, will or deed is very common. The
reader is doubtless familiar with it as applied to a mortgage
deed with power of sale. The power is generally given to be
exercised in a particular way, as, e. g. at auction after advertisement; and it has frequently been decided that a sale
in any other way is invalid." True; but the illustration is a
rather unhappy one for Judge Durfee's argument. The mortgagee's method of proceeding in foreclosing under the power
of sale is, of course, limited to the exact way expressed in
the power; but would Judge Durfee or anyone else contend
for one moment that the existence of the power of sale excludes the mortgagee's right to proceed to foreclose in another way e. g. by suit in equity?
A more helpful rule of construction in this connection is
t h a t which provides that grants by the state are to be construed most favorable to the grantor—that it is not to be
presumed that the state intends to deprive itself of any of
its powers of government. If this rule applies to the ordinary organs of government it applies a fortiori to the people
themselves in their character of ultimate sovereign. Here we
have one of the reserved rights of the people which it is at-
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tempted to whittle down by mere legal intendments and
technical rules. The words of Chief Justice Taney in Charles
River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, apply here with
especial force: "The object and end of all government is to
promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by
which it is established, and it can never be assumed that the
Government intended to diminish the power of accomplishing the end for which it was created . . . . We cannot deal
thus with the rights reserved to the States, and by legal intendment and mere technical reasoning take away from them
any portion of that power."
Just as "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding" so we must also never forget that it is a
right of the people we are passing upon. I t is not one of
those rights created and granted to a department of government by the people in their constitution and frequently limited and restricted by the terms of the grant. I t is that ultimate right of sovereignty retained by the grantors—the right
to revoke or to alter the powers and authorities granted to
their agents. Such a right the people can never be conceived
as intending to abdicate or limit unless by the most express
and unmistakable terms.

ARTICLE XIII NOT A LIMITATION OF THE POWER
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
If, as has been demonstrated above, the people have never
abrogated their right to change the constitution by the convention method, a method which the greatest of our constitutional expounders has characterized as "the only manner
in which they (the people) can act safely, effectively, and
wisely" (Marshall, C. J . in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316), then it would seem to require the most convincing demonstration to convince the mind that they had
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either neglected to provide the means of bringing about the
election of such a convention or had deliberately forbidden
the establishment of machinery for effectively exercising that
right. The opponents of the view herein set forth are now
reduced to the position of maintaining that this essential
right of the people is merely a right without a remedy. The
people have the right but may not exercise it. This position
is supported not by any express words to be found in the
constitution, but only by an ingenious and technical, though
inherently sophistical, argument on the application to Article X I I I of the maxim—expressio unius.
The framers of our constitution were above all things
solicitous that the power of the legislative branch of the
state government should be kept at its maximum. Under
the Charter t h a t power was almost omnipotent; and no one
who has any familiarity with the events of 1842 in Rhode
Island could ever accuse the members of the convention
which framed our existing constitution of being radical innovators. Can we attribute to them by implication alone an
intention to diminish the powers of an assembly whose virtual omnipotence it had always been their object to uphold?
The terms in which the authority of the General Assembly is granted are highly significant. First, by Article IV,
Section 2, the legislative power under the constitution is
vested in the two houses of the General Assembly. This seems
to be a plenary grant of all power of a legislative nature and
that nothing f u r t h e r could remain undisposed of. But in
their extreme desire to make as large as possible the power
of this branch of the government they added to Article IV,
Section 10, "The general assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited
in this constitution." This last section, if it is to be taken
to have any effect, must mean that any residuum of governmental power not granted to any other organ of government
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was to be vested in the General Assembly. This plenitude
of power it is now sought to cut down by restrictions to be
implied by merely technical reasoning from the terms of Article X I I I .
I t is said that, when a right or power is granted and the
exact method of exercising that right or power is pointed
out, that exact method must be pursued to the exclusion of
another method which might be devised. That is the doctrine of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius and,
as a general principle for solving ambiguities in written instruments, its utility and soundness are not disputed. I t
has, moreover, a legitimate function to perform in the interpretation of Article X I I I . It is its illegitimate use and application we here oppose.
The proper application of the maxim is this. Article X I I I
is purely permissive; it allows the General Assembly, if it
sees fit, to propose amendments to the constitution. I t does
not command that it shall. The imperative is only used in
prescribing how it shall proceed if it does decide to propose
amendments. It is a grant of power to the General Assembly
to propose amendments and a prescription of how the proposals shall be passed and presented to the people. This direction as to how the legislature shall exercise its power is
exclusive. It may or may not in its discretion propose amendments but, if it does it, shall do it in the manner pointed out.
This is the legitimate application of the maxim to Article
XIII.
The improper application of the maxim to the terms of
Article X I I I , which is here opposed, is that which seeks to
make the permissive authority to propose amendments a
reason to imply an exception from the general grant of legislative power. The two things are wholly different in their
nature and afford no possible occasion for invoking the doctrine. One relates to proposals of amendments by the Gen-
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eral Assembly, the other to the enacting of legislation relative to the assembling and organization of a constitutional
convention. Neither is inconsistent with the existence of the
other and so the existence of the one does not preclude the
existence of the other.
If Article X I I I were omitted from the constitution, would
the General Assembly under its general grant of legislative
power have authority to propose amendments to the people
for their approval or rejection? Probably no one would
attempt to uphold the existence of such a power. And the
reason is clear. The power to propose amendments is not a
legislative power at all. I t is purely an administrative function and might with equal propriety have been confided to
some other organ of the government, as in the first Vermont
constitution where it was vested in the Council of Censors.
I t s non-legislative character is especially evident from the
manner in which it is exercised. Legislative acts are sent
to the executive for his approval or veto. Not so with proposals for amending the constitution. They are complete
upon passing both houses by the required majority. On this
the practice of the Congress of the United States is particularly instructive. In the teeth of the last paragraph of Section 7 Article I of the United States Constitution, resolutions of this kind are not presented to the president because
they are not considered legislative or law-making in character. When by inadvertence the Slavery Amendment proposal was presented to President Lincoln and approved by
him in 1864, a resolution was passed in the United States
Senate declaring that this action was unnecessary, was done
by inadvertence and should not be taken as a precedent. The
power then to propose amendments, granted in Article X I I I
not being a legislative power cannot be the basis for an implied exception from the general legislative power granted
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by Article IV by an application of the maxim: expressio
unius est exclusio altering.
Judge Durfee tells us that Article I, Section 1, of the
Constitution was adopted as a substitute for a provision
which was rejected and which read, "The people have an
inalienable and indefeasible right, in their original sovereign and unlimited capacity, to ordain and institute government, and in the same capacity to alter, reform and totally
change the same, whenever their safety or happiness requires." Then he makes this admission (Durfee, op. cit. p.
46) : "If the declaratory clause, which was offered and rejected in the convention, which framed our constitution, had
been adopted, we should find it difficult to maintain that the
special provision is exclusive and controlling." Does the
learned jurist mean that if the declaration of right were
embellished with the adjectives "inalienable", "indefeasible",
"sovereign" and "unlimited" he would throw overboard the
whole labored argument, expressio unius and all, and agree
that the General Assembly could call a constitutional convention? I t is submitted that the language used in Article
I Section 1 has exactly the same meaning as the language
of the rejected provision though expressed in more restrained
terms. The "right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government" is just as much a right as one
that is characterized as "inalienable", "indefeasible" and
"sovereign", and, under the one as under the other, it is
equally "difficult to maintain that the special provision is
exclusive and controlling."

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION
Judge Durfee tells us that contemporaneous construction
is best and gives us, on p. 56 of the work cited above, an
extract from a charge to the Newport grand jury in 1843
delivered by his father, Chief Justice Job Durfee, from
which it appears that the elder statesman held substantially
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the same views as the younger. He might have added that
in the same year one William G. Goddard, a professor of
moral philosophy and metaphysics at Brown University, delivered an address to the people of Rhode Island on the
occasion of the change from the charter government to the
constitutional, in which he expressed similar convictions but
in the vague and uncertain language commonly employed by
non-lawyers in treating of legal subjects. No other contemporary seems to have expressed similar views. But if these
two gentlemen held this opinion on the question there were
many who held the opposite. On March 14, 1842 there appeared in a newspaper in the city of Providence "The Nine
Lawyers' Opinion" signed by the leaders of the Rhode Island
bar, Samuel Y. Atwell, Joseph K. Angell, Thomas F. Carpenter, David Daniels, Thomas W. Dorr, Levi C. Eaton, John
P. Knowles, Dutee J . Pearce and Aaron White, J r . This was
reprinted as No. 11 of Rhode Island Historical Tracts published a t Providence in 1880 by Sidney S. Rider. The purpose of the opinion was to justify the legitimacy of the People's Constitution and the government elected under it. The
concluding paragraph of this opinion is contemporaneous
construction by the leaders of our bar at the very time of
the adoption of the constitution. I t reads, "The authorities
go much f a r t h e r than the case presented in Rhode Island,
where we have no Charter, Constitution, Law or usage, which
prescribes any mode of amending the Government; and they
assert, and in the clearest and most express language, that
where there is a Constitution, the people are not bound to
proceed in the manner prescribed in it for its own amendment, though this way may be more convenient or expedient;
but that they may rightfully proceed in the mode and manner which they deem most proper."
In the year of the adoption of our present constitution
two other constitutions had been proposed and voted upon
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by the people of Rhode Island, the so-called "Landholders
Constitution" and the "People's Constitution". Each of these
documents contained the language of Article X I I I and neither made express provision for the calling of constitutional
conventions. The "People's Constitution" was framed and
adopted by a convention November 18, 1841; the existing
constitution was framed by a convention one year later. The
framers of the "People's Constitution" held the doctrine that
the people had the right and power to assemble and adopt a
new constitution by the convention method without the approval of the General Assembly and even against its will,
and that this right was inherent and inalienable. Yet they
embodied in their constitution the identical provisions which
it is argued relinquish and surrender this power. No person
who has the slightest acquaintance with Rhode Island affairs
at this period will pretend for a minute that Governor Dorr
and his supporters so interpreted the language used in Article X I I I as to take away the right of the people to revise
their constitution by means of a convention. Here is contemporary construction of a nature that cannot be disregarded.
In December 1842, one month after the present constitution had been voted on by the people qualified to vote under
the Charter, the Democratic State Convention assembled
and adopted resolutions recommending to the democrats of
the state to register for the purpose of voting for state officers under the constitution but added, "That in recommending this course, and in order to avoid all doubt or misconstruction of our purposes, we explicitly avow our object to
be, to accomplish in a satisfactory manner, and with the
least delay, the establishment in fact, as well as in right, of
the people's constitution." This object they sought to attain
at their first opportunity and the general assembly in 1853,
at its May session, passed an Act providing for a constitu-
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tional convention subject to the approval of the electorate.
At an election held J u n e 28, 1853, the act was rejected. At
its session in October of the same year the general assembly
passed an act for a convention to revise the constitution
subject to the approval of the voters. A t an election held
November 21, 1853, the act was rejected. What about these
acts, providing for constitutional conventions? Were not
these contemporaneous constructions? The fact that they
were rejected in the first instance by 1712 votes and in the
second by 3840 votes is no proof of the existence of any contemporaneous conviction on the part of the electors of the
state that the legislature lacked the power to make these
proposals but is proof positive of a conviction on the part of
the legislators that they possessed that power.

PRECEDENTS FROM OTHER STATES
While the Constitutional Convention which framed the
constitution of the United States was considering the question of how it should be submitted, it was well understood
that the ratification of it in any particular state necessarily
involved a change in the constitution of that state, for, by it,
the powers of the local legislatures and other organs of government were profoundly affected. Most of the state constitutions in 1788 had no provisions for constitutional conventions and in Maryland and in Delaware a specific mode
of change was expressly pointed out. Here is the account
given by George Ticknor Curtis, in his Constitution of the
United States, Vol. II, p. 482, of the reasons which influenced the framers of the United States Constitution to provide for the convention method in submitting that instrument:
"Then came the question, in what mode the assent of the
people of the States was to be given. The constitution of
one of the States (Maryland) provided that it should be
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altered only in a prescribed mode; and it was said that the
adoption of the Constitution now proposed would involve
extensive changes in the constitution of every State. This
was equally true of the constitutions of those States which
had provided no mode for making such changes, and in
which the State officers were all bound by oath to support
the existing constitution. These difficulties, however, were
by no means insurmountable. I t was universally acknowledged that the people of a State were the fountain of all
political power, and if, in the method of appealing to them,
the consent of the State government that such appeal should
be made were involved, there could be no question that the
proceeding would be in accordance with what had always
been regarded as a cardinal principle of American liberty.
For, since the birth of that liberty, it had been always assumed that, when it has become necessary to ascertain the
will of the people on a new exigency, it is for the existing
legislative power to provide for it by an ordinary act of legislation."
The constitution of Maryland, adopted in 1776 and then
in force, contained no provision for the calling of a constitutional convention and contained no general declaration of
the right of the people such as now forms Article I Section
1 of ours. I t did contain this section: " L I X That the Form
of Government and Declaration of Eights, and no p a r t thereof, shall be altered, changed or abolished unless a bill so to
alter, change or abolish the same pass the General Assembly,
and be published at least three months before a new election,
and shall be confirmed by the General Assembly after a new
election of Delegates in the first session after such new election." If the maxim expressio unius were applied here, as
contended for by Judge Durfee and his followers, this would
be the only way in which the Maryland constitution could
be amended. Now, obviously, the adoption of the Constitu-
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tion of the United States in Maryland would be an amendment or alteration to the State constitution. The Maryland
general asembly, however, promptly passed an act in December, 1788, without the publication for three months or the
confirmation of a new assembly, calling a constitutional convention which in April, 1789, ratified the United States Constitution.
Of course, in 1788, the Maryland legislature did not have
the benefit of the opinion of either the elder or the younger
Judge Durfee. B u t in 1850 t h a t opinion was available and,
nevertheless, the Maryland general assembly felt itself free
from the bonds of the Durfee application of expressio unius
and passed an act for a convention which met in Annapolis
in t h a t year and framed a constitution for the state which
was ratified by the people of Maryland J u n e 4, 1851.
In Massachusetts the original constitution of 1790 contained no provision for amendment. In 1820 a convention
was held which adopted the first nine amendments. These
were ratified by the people. The ninth amendment is, with
slight differences of phraseology, the same as our Article
X I I I . I t provides for the proposing of amendments by the
legislature. Notwithstanding this express provision, two
constitutional conventions have been held in that state, one
in 1853 and the other in 1916. The first came to nothing but
the second framed several amendments, which, by popular
vote, have become part of the Massachusetts constitution.
The rather ambiguous opinion of the Justices, given in 1833,
but never published in the Massachusetts Reports until 1850,
in 6 Cushing 573, was not interpreted by the legislatures in
1853 and 1916 in accord with the Durfee theory. Nor did the
Hon. Samuel W. McCall, Governor of Massachusetts in 1916,
hold this view of it, when in his inaugural message J a n u a r y
6, 1916, he said: " I believe the time has come when our
constitutional system should receive t h a t connected and
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careful revision which it can best receive from a convention
chosen for the purpose." The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts also, in Loring vs. Young 239 Mass. 349, decided in 1921, at least tacitly approved the legitimacy of the
convention of 1916.
The Delaware constitution of 1776 declared that certain
parts thereof should never be changed in any manner and
that the remaining parts might be amended by the vote of
five-sevenths of the lower house of the legislature and the
vote of seven members of the upper house. This specific
method was ignored and in 1792 a new constitution was
framed by a convention and adopted by the people. This constitution changed not only the parts declared amendable by
the previous constitution but also those which were to share
the distinction of the laws of the Medes and the Persians.
The constitution of Pennsylvania adopted in 1838 and in
force until 1873 contained a specific provision for amendments to be proposed by the legislature and no provision for
the calling of a constitutional convention. In 1873 a convention was called and did adopt a constitution which was
ratified by the people. The legitimacy of this action was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wells vs.
Bain, 75 Penn. St. 39 and Wood's Appeal, 75 Penn. St. 59.
In Louisiana the constitution of 1898 contained no provision for the calling of a constitutional convention but did
contain an express provision permitting the proposal of
amendments to the people by the General Assembly with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each
house. This method was disregarded and a constitutional
convention adopted the Constitution of 1913 which was ratified by the people. The legality of this constitution was contested in the courts by the American Sugar Refining Co.
which objected to some of its provisions for the suppression
of monopolies and in State vs. American Sugar Refining Co.,
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137 La. 407, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the 1913
constitution.
On both logical and historical grounds the answer of this
court to the questions propounded should be in the affirmative. The better reasoning, the opinion of eminent writers,
the contemporary interpretation, and the example of the
other states, all point but one way, that the people of Rhode
Island have the right to alter or amend their constitution by
the method of a convention which, as Chief Justice Marshall
says, is "the only manner in which they can act safely, effectively and wisely."
Respectfully submitted,
J A M E S T . GREENE.
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STATEMENT OF SCOPE OF BRIEF
This brief will be confined solely to a consideration of subdivision (c) of the question of law upon which His Excellency, Theodore Francis Green, Governor of the State of
Rhode Island, has requested the judges of the Supreme Court
to give their written opinion, namely:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative
power if the General Assembly should provide
by law:
(c)
That the General Officers of the state
shall by virtue of their offices be members of
such convention:"
There must necessarily be assumed, for the purposes of
this brief and argument, the existence of an inherent legislative power to call a Constitutional Convention notwithstanding the fact that the constitution of this state itself points
out how it may be amended. I t might also be added, that
the decided weight of authority and the more numerous precedents are arrayed on the side of the doctrine that has been
assumed to exist for the purposes of this brief.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The General Assembly Has No Power to Provide By
Law That Any Person or Certain Persons Shall Be Members of a Constitutional Convention.
The leading case in support of the proposition that the
General Assembly has no power to provide by law that the
General Officers of the state shall by virtue of their offices
be members of the convention is Goodrich vs. Moore, 2 Minn.
61, which was an application for a writ of injunction by
Goodrich, the state printer, to restrain the defendant from
publishing the journals and proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. The plaintiff alleged that he was
elected state printer by the legislature and that it was his
duty as such "to do the incidental printing of each House
of the Legislature, to print the journals and pamphlet laws
and all such other Territorial or State printing as may
accrue during the recess of the Legislative Assembly". The
plaintiff also alleged that the legislature appropriated
$30,000 for the expenses of a Constitutional Convention including the printing and all other incidental expenses. The
court denied the writ of injunction on three grounds, to
wit:
1. The plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law because
no irreparable damage will ensue.
2. The legislature of Minnesota did not intend to include
in the plaintiff's duties the right to print the Convention
proceedings, because "There is no reason to suppose that at
the time of the passage of this act, the Legislature had at all
in view the assembling of a Constitutional Convention, nor
that they assumed the right in any manner to control its proceedings or interfere with its legitimate functions".
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3. Finally, the court decided that even had the Legislature intended and attempted to claim and exercise the act
of providing a printer for the Constitutional Convention, it
would have been unauthorized and unwarrantable interference with the rights of that body and the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, after declaring the Constitutional Convention to
be "the highest legislative assembly recognized in law" said:
" I t has full control of all its proceedings and may
provide in such manner as it sees fit to perpetuate its
records and altho the convention may have been called
together by legislative authority, that body has no right
to select officers for the convention or otherwise control
the transaction of its legitimate business . . . . the admission of such a right in the legislature would place
the convention under its entire control; . . . i t would
have less power than a town meeting and be incompetent to perform the objects for which it was convened.
I t would be absurd to suppose a constitutional convention had only such limited authority. I t is the highest
legislative assembly recognized in law, invested with
the right of enacting or framing the supreme law of the
state. It must have plenary power for this and all the
incidents thereof. The fact that the convention was
assembled by the authority of the legislature renders
it in no respect inferior thereto, as it may well be
claimed whether, had the legislature refused to make
provision for calling the convention, the people in their
sovereign capacity would not have had the right to have
taken such measure for confirming the adoption of the
constitution as to them seems meet."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held in
the case of Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613, 708;
"First—Thata constitutional convention lawfully convened does not derive its powers from the legislature,
but from the people.
Second—That the powers of a constitutional convention
are in the nature of sovereign powers.
Third—That the legislature can neither limit nor restrict them in the exercise of these powers".
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POINT II
The People of the State Have the Right to Elect Their
Own Delegates to a Constitutional Convention and Any
Legislative Interference With That Right is Invalid.
Constitutions are ordained and established by the people
of a sovereign state or county. Hence it is essential that all
of the delegates to a Constitutional Convention be elected
directly by the people.
The preamble of the present constitution of Rhode Island
indicates very explicitly that it emanates from the people.
"We, the people of the State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, grateful to Almighty God for
the civil and religious liberty which he hath so long
permitted us to enjoy . . .
do ordain and establish
this constitution of government".
Likewise, the Constitution of the United States by its preamble indicates that sovereignty rests with the people. I t is
a compact between people and not between states.
"We, the people of the United States, in order to form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America".
In the words of Chief Justice Burford, in the case of
Frantz et al. vs. Autry, 16 Okl. 631:
"In the American form of republican government,
sovereignty rests in the people, and is exercised through
representatives. In forming a constitution and state
government the people act through their representatives in the convention, but they do not delegate all
their legislative power to the convention. They reserve unto themselves the power of final approval or
disapproval. The convention formulates, proposes, and
submits proposals for the form of government and the
fundamental laws; the people in their sovereign capacity enact these provisions into law".
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Proper constitutional procedure requires that any and all
the delegates to a law-enacting body of such momentous importance be elected directly by the people—it is not enough
that they be elected or designated by the representatives of
the people.
The following excerpt from the case of Sproule vs. Fredericks, 68 Miss. 898, 904 indicates the nature of a Constitutional Convention:
" I t is the highest representative body known to
freemen in a representative government. I t is supreme
in its sphere. It wields the power of sovereignty, specially delegated to it for the purpose and the occasion
by the whole electoral body, for the good of the whole
commonwealth. The sole limitation upon its powers
is, that no change in the form of government shall be
done or attempted".
Note the language of the court where it says " I t (the convention ) wields the power of sovereignty specially delegated
to it for the purposes and the occasion by the whole electoral
body . . . " While it must be conceded that the general officers are representatives of the people, it can hardly be said
that they are representatives of the people for the purpose
and occasion of a constitutional convention.
Words of similar effect may be found in the case of In re
Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, where the court said:
"In our system of government, a written constitution
is the highest expression of law; none other emanates
directly from the sovereign people themselves. I t is
the deliberate and affirmative utterance of the sovereign majority".
The Honorable Elihu Root, one of the ablest lawyers and
statesmen of this country, in speaking of the importance of
the independence of the convention said:
" I t is f a r more important that a Constitutional Convention should possess these safeguards of its independence than it is for an ordinary legislature;
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because the convention acts are of a more momentous
and lasting consequence and because it has the power
to pass upon the power, emoluments and the very existence of the judicial and legislative officers who
might otherwise interfere with it. The convention
furnishes the only way by which the people can exercise their will, in respect of these officers, and their
control over the convention would be wholly incompatible with the free exercise of that will".—Report
of Judiciary Committee, Elihu Root, Chairman, N. Y.
Const. Conv. (1894) pages 79, 80.
Mr. Livingston in the New York Constitutional Convention
of 1821 thus stated the position of the members of the convention :
"The people are here themselves, they are present
in their delegates. No restrictions limit our proceedings, we are standing on the foundations of society".—
Proceedings of N. Y. Const. Conv. p. 199.
The fact that the ultimate power to approve or reject the
proposed constitution remains with the whole body of electorate will not satisfy the requirement t h a t all the delegates
to the convention be chosen directly by the people, because
the power of rejection or ratification is strictly limited to the
particular constitution proposed by the convention and unless the people are represented by their delegates to the convention, the part which they perform in determining the actual structure and contents of the Constitution will be most
insignificant.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing authorities and the basic principle
underlying our form of government: that the sovereignty
rests with the people, and therefore they have the right to
elect delegates expressly for the purpose of proposing
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a constitution, and finally to accept or reject such constitution, the irresistible conclusion is that a Constitutional Convention is, and ought to be, free from all legislative interference, and therefore it is respectfully but earnestly submitted
that subdivision (c) of the question of law submitted by his
Excellency, Theodore Francis Green, Governor of the State
of Rhode Island, be answered in the negative.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE A J O O T I A N .
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THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, ON THE
LEGALITY OF HOLDING A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO AMEND THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION OF RHODE ISLAND.
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State of Rhode Island
S U P R E M E COURT
In re: Opinion of the Supreme Court as Requested By His
Excellency, Governor Theodore Francis Green, on
the Legality of Holding a Constitutional Convention
to Amend the Present Constitution of Rhode Island.
B R I E F OF
EDGAR V. F. McCRILLIS
This is a proceeding brought according to Section I I I of
Article X as amended by Section I I of Amendment I X of the
Constitution of Rhode Island, in which His Excellency, the
Governor of the State of Rhode Island, has asked this Court
to prepare its opinion on the following questions of law:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power
if the General Assembly should provide by law
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the State:
" ( b ) that the Governor shall call for the election at
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such number and manner as the General Assembly may determine:
" ( c ) that the General officers of the State shall by
virtue of their offices be members of such convention:
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such convention :
" ( e ) for the submission to the people, for their ratification and adoption, of any Constitution or amendments proposed by such convention; and
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote
of a majority of the electors voting upon the question
of such ratification and adoption?"
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POINT
THE MODE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
OF RHODE ISLAND AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE
XIII OF THAT INSTRUMENT DOES NOT EXCLUDE OTHER LEGAL MODES OF AMENDMENT.
ARGUMENT
In view of the decision rendered in the Opinion of the Justices,, 14 R. I., 649, which held that article of the present
Rhode Island Constitution formed the exclusive method of
legally amending that instrument.
I t becomes necessary before deciding any of the questions
presented in this case to determine whether the Constitution
of Rhode Island can be amended by a constitutional convention, although that instrument does not provide for amendment by that method.
There are two clear ways of amending a Constitution:
1. The mode provided in the existing Constitution.
2. A revolution.
There can be no question that if the people revolt and succeed in setting up a new government contrary to and in defiance of the old government that the new government would
supplant the old and that the question of whether this was
a legal proceeding or not can never arise in the Courts set
up by the new government.
See Luther vs. Borden, 7 How., 1
Miller vs. Johnson, 92 Ky., 589
The question then presents itself whether the Constitution
may legally and without revolution be amended by a convention of the people; that is to say, whether a convention of the
people may meet and revise in whole or in part the existing
framework of government in a manner not inconsistent with
that existing framework. The mode of amendment set forth
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in Article X I I I of the Rhode Island Constitution provides
that the legislature may at two different sessions propose an
amendment to the Constitution, and if passed by the legislature at those two sessions, may be submitted to the people
for their approval or disapproval. If the people answer favorably there will be a valid amendment to the Constitution.
This is the only specific mode of amendment.
There is no question but t h a t the political framework of
the State of Rhode Island is based upon republican principles.
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a republican form of government."
U. 8. Constitution Art. IV, Sec. IV.
Webster has defined a republican form of government as
follows:
"A State in which the sovereign power resides in a
certain body of the people and is exercised by representatives elected by and responsible to them . . . . republican now often specifically implies such a free popular
government in which there are no classes having any exclusive political privileges, and in which the electorate
includes at least the great body of adult male inhabitants under constitutional restrictions."
When the people of this State undertook in 1843 to make a
Constitution they asserted the right to govern themselves.
They undertook to solve the problem of self-government, to
establish a government not distinct from and adverse to the
people, but a government of the people themselves, to be administered by and through the people acting, of course, not
in their collective and primary capacity, because that was
impossible, but, as they could only act, through agents appointed to do their work and their will. They undertook to
make their own government in the sense that it is a government that they made and created for their own purposes to
be administered by their own hands, acting through the in-
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strumentality of officers and agents. The people are thus
the creators of legislatures, but they themselves are not a
legislature. They can make the frame of government, establish, define, and construct its great departments and clothe
them with their several powers. They can elect to office or
remove from office. They can set up and keep the whole
agency in motion. This done, the people repose on their sovereignty and supervise their servants in their several spheres
of political employment. They are constituted and they remain the source of all power. They having made a Constitution have given a power of attorney therein to the legislature
to make statute laws under that constitution, and as long as
that power of attorney exists the principle cannot exercise a
power which he has expressly conferred upon his agent.
But then comes the question—Is the power irrevocable?
Can the principle revoke his power of attorney? In ordinary
transactions the terms of power determine this matter, and
the principle is precisely the same with regard to the power
of the people. So long as their Constitution exists it is a
power of attorney, giving to their agents and representatives
a power therein expressly conveyed; but it should not be
irrevocable. The officers and office holders have been created agents, but they have no such interest in their agency
so as to make the agency irrevocable. Therefore, whenever
the people choose to revoke their power of attorney they can
do so. This is the fundamental principle in republicanism.
If the people have power to make a Constitution there is no
statute of limitations that foreclose the exercise of that
power. As the people alone have an incontestible, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute governments, they
should also have the power to reform, alter, or totally change
the same when their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it. The power of creation implies the power to
alter, change, or destroy.
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It is true that the Constitution of the State of Rhode
Island has not specifically reserved to the people the right
of amending that Constitution by a convention, but on the
other hand, there is no mention in that instrument of any
surrender of such a power. If they have never given away
power it is useless to speaks of powers reserved. The sovereign has no need to make reservations of power not given, because the sovereign loses nothing by making no reservations.
In the absence of such express surrender there is a broad underlying principle of government which runs over and above
the Constitution t h a t the people can alter or change their
framework of government in a mode different from the mode
set up in that Constitution.
"In considering state constitutions we must not commit the mistake of supposing that, because individual
rights are guarded and protected by them, they must
also be considered as owing their origin to them. These
instruments measure the powers of the rulers, but they
do not measure the rights of the governed."
Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations,
68.
It is to be noted that Section I of Article I of the Constitution of Rhode Island reads as follows:
"In the words of the Father of His Country, we declare that the basis of our political societies is the right
of the people to make and alter their Constitutions of
government."
This is a clear recognition that the people are the authors
and not the incidents of government. Having made the government they do not thereby become mere incidents of government so that they can never alter or change it without
its consent, and therefore there is meaning in Article I of
Section 1 of our Constitution where it declares that the
people have the right to make and alter their Constitution.
The framers of our Constitution certainly never intended to
restrict the right of the people to modernize their system of
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government to the whim of the legislature. This would be
the result if the mode of amendment provided in Article
X I I I of the Constitution of Rhode Island were the exclusive
method of amendment. In speaking of a similar provision in
the Constitution of Pennsylvania the Supreme Court of that
State said:
"If it should appear that such a power (to amend the
Constitution by convention, although that mode is not
mentioned in the existing Constitution) has been so recognized and acted upon frequently as a fundamental
principle underlying all free government, this provision
will appear to be a solemn declaration of the existence
of such a right and may in ordinary parlance fairly be
said without any great breach of legal accuracy to confer a power under the Constitution."
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa., 59.
I t is to be observed that nearly every one of the older
States of this Union has amended its form of government by
constitutional conventions at least once, and the new governments so set up have been recognized as legal.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the opinion reported in 14 R. I., 649, decided that the method of amendment as
provided in Article X I I I of the Rhode Island Constitution is
the only method whereby that instrument can be legally
amended. It decided that the mention of one mode of amendment was an intention to exclude other modes.
I t is true that this argument is one very generally used
in the interpretation of contracts between man and man, but
I submit that it should not be applied to such a great instrument as a Constitution.
Mr. Jameson, in his work on constitutional conventions
says, with great force, upon this question:
"Viewed upon principle, were there no authority upon
the point, it would be doubtful whether, dealing in great
questions of politics and government, the same maxim
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ought to prevail which regulates the construction of contracts between man and man. As a matter of speculation it may be admitted that the rule expresses the
weight of probability equally in cases of great and small
magnitude. But there is always a doubt; and between
the cases indicated there is the wide difference that in
ordinary contracts it is possible to enforce the construction which the courts shall pronounce the true one,
whilst in the case of constitutional provisions regulating
great organic movements, to hold such a maxim applicable would be, by presenting barriers to the attainment
of what the people generally desire, to make that revolutionary which perhaps was not so.
"Where the intention of the framers of a Constitution
is doubtful, the people, assuming power under the
broader construction, should have the benefit of the
doubt; and that all the more because in opposition to
them our courts are comparatively powerless. I t is infinitely better where no principle is violated that a Constitution should be so construed as to make their action
legal rather than illegal."
" I do not understand t h a t there is anything in the
terms of this provision of the Constitution which makes
it the sole and only mode in which the provisions of the
Constitution are to be amended. I do not understand
the principle to be that the mention of one mode excludes all the other modes which would have existed
but for the mention of that mode. What is the principle
upon this subject? I admit the principle in common
law that the designation of one person or one thing in
some instances is exclusive of all others; but does that
principle apply to this case? That principle applies to
all cases where, from the necessity or the nature of the
case it is shown to be the intent that other things should
be excluded. If there is but one mode of several to be
adopted, and one mode is prescribed, of course that excludes all the others. I may go farther than that. It
may be true from the nature of the case, one mode being
set down, that no other was intended, or in contempla-

236
tion; but it is not so in this case. Is not this mode of
amending the Constitution, which is prescribed in the
Constitution in express terms, perfectly consistent with
the other mode, by a Convention of delegates? There
is no antagonism between the two modes. The people
say by their Constitution, 'We will have a convenient
mode by which this instrument can be amended without
a Convention, and we will therefore embody a provision
that the opinion of two successive legislatures that the
Constitution ought to be amended shall be submitted to
us for our action without the expense of a Convention.'
Does this exclude the idea that a convention may be held
when there is nothing antagonistic between the two
modes? By no means! Sir, I do not stand alone in this
opinion. I am supported in it by eminent writers on
constitutional law. I will read an extract from Mr.
Rawle's Treatise on the Constitution, and one whose
opinions are entitled to high respect. He says:
" 'The laws of one legislature may be repealed by another legislature, and the power to repeal them cannot
be withheld by the power that enacted them. So the
people may, on the same principle, at any time, alter or
abolish the Constitution they have framed. This has
been frequently and peaceably done by several of these
States since 1776. If a particular mode of effecting such
alterations has been agreed on, it is most convenient to
adhere to it, but it is not exclusively binding'."
I Debates Massachusetts Const. Conv. 1856, 153.
" I t has been generally recognized that to legally
change the Constitution by convention without a specific authority in the Constitution having been given to
that effect that the legislature under the existing Constitution must join with the people to propose the new
Constitution."
6 R. C. L., 27. See also Barto vs. Himrod, 4 N. Y.,
583.
" I t would seem as though the question as to whether
the calling of a constitutional convention was a legal
exercise of power by the legislature, should now be con-
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sidered by all judicial tribunals as settled so firmly as a
part of the common law of our governments, that any
attempt to disturb it at this day would savor more of
revolution than legitimacy. He would be bold, indeed,
who would now assert that all these conventions were
usurpations, and that all the Constitutions proposed by
them and adopted by the people were revolutionary."
Woods Appeal, 75 Pa., 59.

POINT
THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT OF ITS OWN MOTION ISSUE A CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION WITHOUT FIRST ASCERTAINING
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE UPON THE SPECIFIC
QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE PEOPLE
DESIRE SUCH A CONVENTION.
As the people alone were the creators of the Constitution,
they alone may say whether they desire to amend their creation. The legislature is nothing but the agent of the people
for such specific purposes as are set forth in the Constitution.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any power given to the
legislature to revise the Constitution. If the legislature has
no power of itself to revise, can it by force of its own act
compel the people to hold a convention to revise the Constitution? The only grant of power along these lines contained in the Constitution is the power to propose specific
amendments. W h a t is t h a t power? Is it a limitation of the
power of the legislature or state, a limitation of power of the
people "to make and alter their Constitutions of Government?" When the people of this State assembled in 1843 and
chose certain delegates who framed the present Constitution
and sent t h a t instrument out to the people asking them to
say yes or no, the people did not at that time part with their
sovereignty and close their political existence except upon
sufferance by action of the legislature.
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The power of the legislature in regard to a constitutional
convention is simply to take the initiatory movement of making propositions to the people. This doctrine is based upon
the fundamental principle that power is emanated from the
people where it lies sovereign and inalienable. When the
legislature goes further than its enumerated power, and instead of proposing to the people an amendment, steps aside
from the terms of the Constitution and proposes a convention, that is neither anything constitutional nor unconstitutional, it is simply a proposition. It has no vitality and cannot bind anybody until it comes to the act of the people. The
people vote upon it and if they say yes, that puts the breath
of life into it. But until that time it is nothing.
While an agent may ask his principle to reform the terms
of his employment, yet he may not command the principle to
change those terms. An analogy may be drawn between the
power of the people to change our Constitution and the legal
requirements that an instrument, deed, or contract can be
set aside or changed only by an instrument, deed, or contract
of like power, no matter whether it be parole, written, or
sealed. These the people have made a Constitution, and they
alone can revoke it. No agent of theirs can undertake or attempt to do so. No agent can take the first step towards it
unless especially ordered by them at first, or sanctioned or
affirmed by them subsequently.
In the words of the Father of his Country,
"We declare that the basis of our political societies
is the right of the people to make and alter their Constitutions of government."
Section I, Article I, Constitution of R.
I.
"The legislature has no inherent rights. Its powers
are derived from the Constitution, and hence, where
some action of the legislative body, which action is
outside of the particular field fixed by the Constitution
and is not strictly legislative within the meaning of
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Section I, Article 4, supra, is sought to be justified, a
warrant, for the same must be found somewhere; if not
in the Constitution, then directly from the people, who,
by the terms of Section I, Article I, of the Bill of Rights,
have retained the right to amend or change their form
of government. The right of the people in this regard
is supreme, subject, however, to the condition that no
new form of a Constitution can be established on the
ruins of the old without some action on the part of the
representatives of the old, indicating their acquiescence
therein; and, the General Assembly being the closest
representative of the old, its approval must be obtained
by some affirmative act. This is the only orderly way
t h a t could be conceived. The question then arises, How
may these, the people and the legislature, get together
on this proposition? If no positive rule is provided by
the fundamental law of the state, then, if a custom has
prevailed for a sufficient length of years so that it is
said to be fully established, that rule or custom must
prevail.
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all of
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself
does not provide for the calling of a constitutional convention, to ascertain first the will of the people and procure from them a commission to call such a convention
before the legislature proceeds to do so. The people being the repository of the right to alter or reform its government, its will and wishes must be consulted before
the legislature can proceed to call a convention."
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind., 533.
"Nor can it be said that it is an empty form to leave
to popular vote the grave question whether the people
shall assemble in convention and revise their fundamental law. True it is that the power to take the initiative
with respect to the calling of a constitutional convention resides in the legislature. In the absence of any
provision in the Constitution on the subject that body
alone can give legality to such a convention. If its foundation is the spontaneous action of the people without
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permissive legislative authority, the movement is revolutionary . . . but while the power resides in the legislature, and that body only to call a constitutional convention, it is obvious that the agents of the people who have
not been selected on that particular issue should not
take upon themselves the responsibility of burdening the
people with the expense of such a movement without
first submitting to them the question whether they desire
such a convention to be called."
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D., 81.
"The customary manner of calling constitutional conventions in the United States is by resolution of the legislature, followed by a submission of the question to the
electorate."
6 R. C. L., 27.
See also Miller vs. Johnson92
Ky., 539.
I t is therefore submitted that questions (a) and (b) contained in the request of His Excellency, the Governor, should
be answered in the negative.

POINT
THE LEGISLATURE HAS NO RIGHT TO SAY WHO
THE MEMBERS OR ANY MEMBER OR MEMBERS
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION SHALL
BE.
"Where a change in the Constitution is made under
proceedings initiated by the legislature, it is not because
the legislature possess any inherent power to change the
existing Constitution through a convention, but because
it is the only means through which an authorized consent of the whole people, the entire State, can be lawfully obtained."
6 R. C. L., 27.
The people themselves are the only parties who can make a
Constitution. Of course, the people d r a f t a proposed new
Constitution through their agents. These agents must represent the people under a specific authorization; that is, to
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draft a new Constitution. The agents of the people for one
purpose are the agents of the people for that purpose alone.
The general officers of the State have been elected with certain powers to carry out certain carefully enumerated duties. No part of their duties as enumerated under the Constitution of Rhode Island includes the power of changing
or proposing changes in the fundamental structure of the
law to their principles. While the legislature has power to
propose to the people the calling of a Convention, it is to be
noticed that the consent of the general officers of the State
is not needed for the validity of such a proposal. Indeed, it
has been held that the signature of the Governor is not only
not necessary to such a resolution of the legislature, but that
he has no veto power under such acts; nor does the consent
or disapproval of any other of the general officers of the
State have any effect upon such a proposal.
See 12 C. J., 693, N. 89, 90.
See also Commonwealth vs. Griest, 196 Pa., 396.
Morris vs. Sec. of State, 43 La., Ann., 590.
Warfield vs. Vandiver, 101 Md., 78, 116 to 121.
Hollingsworth vs. Virginia, 3 Dall., 378.
If, therefore, the general officers have no concern with proposing a new Constitution, how much less can the legislature make such officers a part of the Convention to d r a f t a
new Constitution?
Members of a constitutional convention represent the people, not the people and the members of the old government.
The legislature, the creature of the people, cannot tell the
people who their representatives shall be.
In 1894 the state of New York had under consideration the
revision of its state constitution. One of the first questions
that arose in the convention was the ascertainment of the
rights and powers of the convention to pass upon the election
and qualifications of one of its members. This question was
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referred to the judiciary committee, of which committee the
Honorable Elihu Root, formerly secretary of state, and one
of the ablest lawyers and statesmen of this country, was
chairman. In his report to the convention, he says:
"The convention has been created by the direct action
of the people and has been by them vested with the power and charged with the duty to revise and amend the
organic law of the state.
"The function with which it is thus charged is a part
of the highest and most solemn act of popular sovereignty and in its performance the convention has and
can have no superior but the people themselves.
"No court or legislature or executive officer has authority to interfere with the exercise of the powers or
the performance of the duties which the people have enjoined upon this, their immediate a g e n t . . . .
" I t is f a r more important that a constitutional convention should possess these safeguards of its independence than it is for an ordinary legislature; because the
convention acts are of a more momentous and lasting
consequence and because it has to pass upon the power,
emoluments and the very existence of the judicial and
legislative officers who might otherwise interfere with
it. The convention furnishes the only way by which the
people can exercise their will, in respect of these officers, and their control over the convention would be
wholly incompatible with the free exercise of that will."
Proceedings of the New York Constitutional
Convention,
1894, pages 70-80.
The delegates to the convention were not the agents or
representatives of congress, but they were the immediate
agents and representatives of the people of the two territories. They derived their power and authority from the
people in their sovereign capacity. And this is in harmony
with the principles of the Declaration of Independence,
which declares that "Governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,"
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and is in keeping with the doctrine announced by Lincoln
when he uttered the immortal words, that this is "A government of the people, by the people, and for the people."
Franz et al vs. Autry, Oklahoma 81, 589.
"The better view would seem to be that the convention is a regular organ of the state (although as a rule
called only at long intervals)—neither sovereign nor
subordinate to the legislature, but independent within
its proper sphere. Under this view the legislature cannot bind the convention as to what shall be placed in the
Constitution, or as to the exercise of its proper duties.
If, then, we say that the convention is independent of
the regular legislature in the exercise of its proper duties, it will be necessary to discuss for a moment what
are its proper functions. These are simply to propose a
new Constitution or to propose constitutional amendments to the people for approval; or, in states where the
submission of Constitutions is not required to frame and
adopt a Constitution if they think proper. In this sphere,
and in the exercise of powers incidental to its proper
functions, it would seem that constitutional conventions
should not be subject to control by legislative acts. As a
rule, then, constitutional conventions are subject only to
the following restrictions: (1) Those contained in or
implied from provisions in the existing state and federal
Constitutions; and (2) in the absence of constitutional
provisions, those derived or implied from the limited
functions of conventions. To these restrictions Jameson
and others would add those imposed by legislative acts
under which conventions are called, but such restrictions are certainly not yet recognized as of absolute
binding force, except in Pennsylvania, and should not be
so recognized if the convention is to be an instrument of
great usefulness."
Dodd, Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions, 80, 92 (1910).
I t is therefore submitted that the question numbered (c),
contained in the request of His Excellency, the Governor,
should be answered in the negative.
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POINT
THE LEGISLATURE MAY MAKE PROVISION FOR
CALLING TOGETHER THE DELEGATES ELECTED T O A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, B U T
MAY N O T INTERFERE WITH THE FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION.
ARGUMENT
The whole power of a constitutional convention is derived
from the vote of the people and not from the legislature. As
the actions of a constitutional convention are something
without the Constitution, the legislature has no power to go
beyond its own limitations as defined by the Constitution.
As they have been given no express powers in regard to a
convention, they cannot act to make rules for the conduct of
such a convention. As the general argument under this point
rests upon the arguments and authorities cited in the previous point, no further argument on this point will be made
at this time.
As it would be idle to submit the question of ratification
or rejection of a proposed new Constitution to the voters
unless means were taken to ascertain the result of such a
vote, it is submitted that question (f) contained in the request of His Excellency, the Governor, should also be answered in the affirmative.
Respectfully submitted,
EDGAR V . F . MCCRILLIS.

